



Equity compensation in distressed industries

Presentation to Texas GEO chapter
David Cross, KPMG LLP

June 8, 2016



Notice

The following information is not intended to be “written advice concerning one or more Federal tax matters” subject to the requirements of section 10.37(a)(2) of Treasury Department Circular 230.

The information contained herein is of a general nature and based on authorities that are subject to change. Applicability of the information to specific situations should be determined through consultation with your tax adviser.



What will we cover...distressed industries

Industry Environment Issues

Impact on Executive Compensation

Retention Model

Alternative Designs



Distressed industries

Strong agreement among investors – 2016 Industries in distress

- Energy – 86%
- Retail – 46%
- Health Care/Medical – 24%
- Education – 22%
- Municipalities – 18%

Characteristics of distress	Possible outcomes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Low Interest Rates & Access to Capital — Broad Global Slowdown — Oversupply 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Bankruptcy — Restructuring — Asset liquidation — Reductions in executive compensation — High turnover among executives

Source: Energy, Retail, Healthcare and Education Facing the Most Distress, AlixPartners Restructuring Survey; January 6, 2016.



Recent headlines

While the Oil & Gas industry is starting to rebound, recent history reminds us of the challenging environment.

<p>Oil prices fall sharply on Oversupply Concerns WSJ – March 14, 2016</p>	<p>KPMG: Price Volatility Driving Energy Business Model Changes KPMG Global Energy Institute May 30, 2016</p>
<p>Commodity Price Plunge Puts Pressure on Local Governments Oil & Gas Journal – May 30, 2016</p>	<p>US Oil Industry Bankruptcy Wave Nears size of Telecom Bust Reuters – May 4, 2016</p>
<p>The Oil Industry Got Together and Agreed Things May Never Get Better Bloomberg – February 2, 2016</p>	<p>Analysts Just Aren't Buying Oil Rally WSJ – April 28, 2016</p>
<p>Big Oil Groups Raise Net Debt by a Third Financial Times – May 29, 2016</p>	<p>MarketWatch: Crude Prices Retreat After Briefly Eclipsing \$50/Barrel Oil & Gas Journal – May 27, 2016</p>



Why evaluate distressed industries?

Most industries experience some form of slow down

Evaluate how down market could impact organization

- Cost Control Priorities
- Employee Morale
- Compensation
- Retention Risks (Real or Assumed)


Develop contingency plans

- Employee Communications
- Cost Management
- Managing Retention Risk
- Compensation Structure & Levels
 - Cash
 - Equity



Total compensation over time

Since 2008, CEO Compensation has increased for the S&P 500, but Oil & Gas has lagged with a clear change in 2014.



Source: S&P Capital IQ.



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

Impact of oil prices on executive bonuses

Change in Total Compensation (reflecting Realized and Realizable gains) can be driven in large part by increases in stock price.

As with any industry, external factors impact stock price – in the case of Oil & Gas, prices have been impacted by:


- Over-supply
- Slower Growth
- Limited investment.

To illustrate the relationship between incentives and Crude Oil prices, consider CEO bonus levels (expressed as a percent of salary) for the S&P 500 and Oil & Gas industry.



Impact of oil prices on executive bonuses (continued)

As expected, Crude Oil prices have a stronger relationship with annual incentive levels in the Oil & Gas industry than in the S&P 500.



Source: S&P Capital IQ.



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

Challenges for the oil & gas industry

Incentives have historically been important factors in the Oil & Gas industry and should therefore consider:

- Low payouts may not (necessarily) reflect management impact.
- Limited incentive payouts can be de-motivating.
- Alternative approach is to have mechanism to recognize the impact of management apart from factors beyond their control – Oil Prices.
- Strive to provide strong message of positive impact.
- Absent these mechanisms and messages, companies increase their retention risk for the management population.



Retention risk

However, experience suggests these common responses:

- Cost Cutting (of Operations)
- Limited (or no) Compensation Increases/payouts
- Reductions in Staff

This experience suggests:

- Retention risk has limited focus in a down market
- Business performance should be considered as an element of managing retention risk

The following model examines the context of retention risk



Retention risk model

Distressed industry

Performance can have a significant impact on retention risk – particularly in a distressed industry.

Absolute performance
Share price targets, annual fixed financial improvement

Relative performance
Peer comparison, Performance vs. Budget, etc.

		Low	High
High	<p>Poor sector performance</p> <p>Shareholders could have done better</p> <p>Modest Retention Risk</p>	<p>Strong overall performance</p> <p>Rewards align with retention objectives</p> <p>Limited Retention Risk</p>	
	<p>Poor overall performance</p> <p>Shareholders Lose</p> <p>High Retention Risk (from Executive's perspective)</p>	<p>Strong sector performance</p> <p>Shareholders Win within Sector</p> <p>High Retention Risk</p>	
Low			

Source: KPMG LLP



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

Assessing retention risk

- Shareholders had better returns had they invested elsewhere within this sector
- Executives have done more with shareholder capital than others in their sector
- Management performance is strong given market conditions
- Recruiters focus here – strong management results (relative), but limited compensation due to poor absolute performance



Source: KPMG LLP

In this context, companies examine alternative means of delivering equity compensation and managing retention risk



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

13

Alternative designs

Mitigating retention risk

Front loading equity

Modify annual Restricted Share grants by reallocating a slightly higher share amount to earlier years

Potential Advantages

- Grant equity sooner to weather down market
- Lower grant price with greater upside – received earlier than normal cycle

Potential Disadvantages

- Continued retention risk in absence of turnaround
- Relies on share price growth

Relative performance to peers

Award shares based on performance levels against peer companies

Potential Advantages

- Seen positively by proxy advisory firms
- Rewards for management efficiency.

Potential Disadvantages

- Challenge to construct peer group
- May have poor optics in light of poor absolute performance

Index against price

Performance goals are adjusted based on factors beyond management's control (e.g., Oil Prices)

Potential Advantages

- Isolates management performance
- Provides a means of managing retention risk

Potential Disadvantages

- Developing a reasonable Index
- May have poor optics in light of poor absolute performance



Front loading equity

Front loading grants with modest increase in shares results in higher award value, delivered earlier than normal cycle – assuming share price moves upward.

Front loading grants

Illustration – All Values are Hypothetical

Share Price	\$50.00
Annual Share Value Award	\$150,000
Number of Shares	3,000

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Share Price	\$50.00	\$60.00	\$66.00	\$69.30	\$72.77
% Growth		20%	10%	5%	5%

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Share Price	\$50.00	\$60.00	\$66.00	\$69.30	\$72.77
% Growth		20%	10%	5%	5%

Normal grant cycle					
Year of grant					
2017	3,000				
2018		3,000			
2019			3,000		
Total Shares Granted				9,000	
Value/End of Cycle			\$198,000	\$207,900	\$218,295
Total Value				\$624,195	

Front loaded grants					
Year of grant					
2017	5,000				
2018		2,250			
2019			2,250		
				9,500	
			\$330,000	\$155,925	\$163,721
				\$649,646	



Relative performance to peers

Relative Plans are common, but may not be recognized for their retentive value – rewarding for sector performance independent of absolute performance.

Relative performance vs. peers

*Illustration – All Values are Hypothetical
Measure: Total Shareholder Return (TSR)*

Share Price	\$50.00
Annual Share Value Award	\$150,000
Number of Shares	3,000

Performance schedule	
%ile ranking	Award multiple
75th %ile and above	200%
50th %ile	100%
25th %ile	50%
Below 25th %ile	0%

Values between levels are interpolated.

TSR of peer group	
Company	Return
A	45%
B	42%
C	39%
D	36%
E	33%
Acme Oil Co.	32%
F	30%
G	27%
H	24%
I	21%
J	18%
K	15%
L	12%
M	9%
N	6%
O	3%
P	0%
Q	-3%
R	-6%
S	-9%
T	-12%
U	-15%
V	-18%
W	-21%
X	-24%
Y	-27%
Z	-30%

Acme's TSR	
Acme's %ile ranking	Award multiple
81%	200%
Resulting Shares	6,000
Price at End of Period	\$72.00
Value of Award	\$432,000



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

Index against price

Applying an adjustment for significant swings in price (for Crude), can enable share awards to be isolated from factors outside of management’s control.

Index against price

Illustration – All Values are Hypothetical

Share Price	\$50.00
Annual Share Value Award	\$150,000
Number of Shares	3,000

Budgeted Net Income Goal (\$B) \$1.50

	Market performance (% change in crude)				
	-20%	-10%	0%	10%	20%
Adjustment to Goal	50%	75%	100%	125%	150%
Adjusted Goal (\$B)	\$0.75	\$1.13	\$1.50	\$1.88	\$2.25
Actual Performance (\$B)	\$1.08	\$1.08	\$1.08	\$1.08	\$1.08
Percent of Adjusted Goal	144%	96%	72%	58%	48%
Share Grant	4,350	2,850	2,400	1,800	0



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

Summary

Because of current conditions, CEO total direct compensation in Oil & Gas lags general industry when considering the impact of realized and realizable gains in equity compensation.

Not surprisingly, there is a relationship between Oil prices (\$ Crude per Barrel) and incentive levels in the Oil & Gas industry.

In addition to cost control efforts, companies in a distressed industry should not lose sight of executive retention risk.

Retention risk is increased when absolute performance (e.g., stock price) is low and relative performance (e.g., peer group comparison) is high.

Three alternative incentive structures can serve as a starting point to examine equity compensation as a means to manage retention risk:

- Front Loaded Equity
- Relative Performance to Peers
- Index Against Price.



© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

18



Questions?



kpmg.com/socialmedia

The information contained herein is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity. Although we endeavor to provide accurate and timely information, there can be no guarantee that such information is accurate as of the date it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future. No one should act on such information without appropriate professional advice after a thorough examination of the particular situation.

© 2016 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. NDPPS 580235

The KPMG name and logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of KPMG International.